The civil society and the regulation of the extractive industry in Nigeria by Ako, Rhuks & Ekhator, Eghosa O.
THE CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE REGULATION




This article focuses on the role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in
impacting on trends and developments in the extractive industry in Nigeria.
For example, CSOs take on the government to promote accountability and
probity in the management of the sector that is beset by ineffectual regulation;
alleged collusion with multinational corporations having as consequences
environmental degradation and human rights abuses; and, ineffective judicial
processes, among other things. On the other hand, CSOs are increasingly
beginning to play prominent roles in collaborations with extractive
corporations in the initiation and management of development programmes.
In a nutshell, this paper aims to engage with both theoretical (based on the
Hood et al conceptualisation of a regulatory regime, which encompasses
information gathering, standard setting and behaviour modification activities)
and practical frameworks (such as litigation, collaboration and pressure by
CSOs) that explain the evolution of CSOs and their “regulatory” roles in
Nigeria’s extractive industry. Civil society and civil society organisation are
used interchangeably.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
CSOs play active roles in the extractive industry in Nigeria. The Niger Delta
has been a centre of protests due to the activities of oil multinational
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corporations (OMNCs) and the inactions of governmental agencies.1 CSOs
and many communities have been at the forefront of promoting the interests
of the people of the Niger Delta.2 Recently, the activities of CSOs have impacted
on the regulatory framework in the extractive sector in Nigeria. This paper
will analyse the impacts of CSOs via the framework developed by Hood et
al.3
This article is divided into five sections. The first section is the introduction.
The second focuses on the conceptual framework of CSOs. Here, the definition
and the quest for an African conceptualisation of CSO will be in focus. The
third section will highlight the Hood et al framework. The fourth section
analyses specific examples of CSO influence on the Nigeria’s extractive industry.
The fifth section, which is the concluding part of the paper, contends that, in
Nigeria, CSOs perform “quasi-regulatory” functions via their activities in the
oil and gas sector. For example, CSOs can challenge MNCs and the government
by boycotts, public campaigns and other forms of pressure.
2.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The literature is replete with numerous definitions of civil society, mainly due
to the “varied and loose manner in which civil society is used in academic
and popular discourses.”4 As Allen has noted in the above regards, the notion
of civil society has become “diffuse, hard to define, empirically imprecise
and ideologically laden.”5 One way of identifying civil society is by identifying
who may be included in this classification6 or excluding those that cannot be
incorporated. It is incontrovertible that while state and profit-oriented
organisations are excluded, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), trusts,
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charities, foundations, advocacy groups, national and international non-state
organisations are included.7 It is for this reason that civil society is often
referred to as the third sector.
In Africa, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), which
is the vehicle for building a strong partnership between governments and all
segments of the African civil society8 has identified the groups that fit into the
nomenclature of “civil society” on the continent. According to ECOSOCC,
CSOs include but are not limited to the following: (a) Social groups
such as those representing women, children, the youth, the elderly
and people with disability and special needs; (b) Professional
groups such as associations of artists, engineers, health
practitioners, social workers, media, teachers, sport associations,
legal professionals, social scientists, academia, business
organisations, national chambers of commerce, workers,
employers, industry and agriculture as well as other private sector
interest groups; (c) Non-governmental organisations (NGOs),
community-based organisations (CBOs) and voluntary
organisations; d) Cultural organisations; and (e) social and
professional groups in the African Diaspora in accordance with
the definition approved by the Executive Council.9
In essence, the civil society in Africa encapsulates formal and informal groups
or organisations such as religious groups, local communities and market
women.10
Posner’s definition and theorisation of civil society highlights the critical
contribution that civil society makes to governance. While defining civil society
as the “the reservoir of formal and informal organisations outside of state
control”,11 Posner identifies advocacy and substitution as the two mechanisms
that academic literature uses to buttress the relationship between good
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government conduct and civil society. Under the advocacy model, public
services are provided because civil society monitors the conduct of government
officials and confront them (by lobbying or putting pressure for instance)
when they fail to provide public goods or services.12 In the substitution model,
civil society engages more in the provision of services or contributes to social
welfare by “furnishing the organisational structure and human and financial
resources to provide the order and public services that citizens’ desire.”13 The
substitution model is highly prevalent in the Niger Delta of Nigeria and other
parts of the country. In Mushin, a suburb of Lagos State, for example, the
Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), a local vigilante/socio-cultural group,
provides security instead of the conventional police.14
Two categories of civil groups are discussed here for their particular
contributions to the development of Nigeria’s oil-rich Delta region via advocacy
and substitution. These are community or ethnic-based groups and the civil
and environmental rights groups. Community or ethnic-based groups are
associations of self-organised, self-governing kinsmen with objectives geared
towards the development of the community or ethnic group. These objectives
may be the provision of social services such as infrastructure town halls,
school buildings, for example, or, provision of services viz. medical and
educational enlightenment.15 Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
(MOSOP), a classic example of a CBO (community or ethnic based
organisation), succeeded in sensitising the Ogonis on issues relating to the
oil industry, their environment and human rights as well providing other
communities and ethnic groups with a template to replicate their (MOSOP)
activities. The civil and environmental rights group includes organisations
that have as their objective the promotion of civil and environmental rights
such as Friends of the Earth, Amnesty International amongst others. This sub-
set of CSOs includes local and foreign groups that not only form alliances
with themselves but also with CBOs to achieve their objectives.16
In essence, this section contends that CSOs are perhaps better identified
than construed by an absolute definition. Nonetheless, a working definition
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must be proffered to provide context to the discussion. With this in mind,
CSOs, in this paper, refer to the “the formation of associational life17 of citizens
characterised by common interests and identities, civil and public purposes,
and collective and autonomous actions.”18
3.  OVERVIEW OF FRAMEWORK ON
RISK REGULATORY REGIME
This section will briefly highlight the Hood et al framework. Hood et al
posited that any analysis of a regulatory regime brings to the fore, two distinct
connotations or dimensions.19 First is that any (risk) regulatory regime entails
“the three components that form the basis of any control system – that is,
ways of gathering, ways of setting standards, goals, or targets, and ways of
changing behaviour to meet the standards or targets.”20 Simply put, the first
dimension involves information gathering, standard setting and behaviour
modification. The second dimension of a risk regulatory regime is the
distinction or difference between regulatory regime or “context” and regime
“content”.21 A regime context is the background wherein the regulatory regime
is localised, entailing the preponderance of risk, different manifestation and
how such risks are being addressed, the extent of public attitude towards risk
and how the different actors are affected by the hazard inherent in such risk
regimes.22 On the other hand, the regime content is said to be the interplay or
policy setting of the state and other organisations or institutions involved in
regulating or addressing the risks and attitudes or bias of the regulators.23
The first dimension of the risk regulatory regime highlighted above is
analogous to the regulatory process. For example, in a command and control
based regulatory framework, the state or regulatory agencies partake in the
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regulatory process by engaging in information gathering, standard setting
and behaviour modification activities. However, it has been argued that the
CSOs can also partake or contribute to the aforementioned three components
of the control components of risk regime as enunciated by Hood et al.24 The
contention of this paper is that CSOs have engaged or participated in regulatory
regime in Nigeria’s extractive sector via the three control components of the
risk regulatory regimes as enunciated by Hood et al.
The next section of the paper will analyse specific examples of CSO
influence on Nigeria’s extractive industry. This section will highlight the role
that civil societies play in shaping the legal framework that regulates the
extractive industry.
4.  THE ROLE OF CSOs IN THE REGULATION OF
THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA
A regulatory regime can be defined as the laws, regulations and policies
guiding an industry or sector. Nigeria operates a command and control type
of regulation in the oil and gas sector.25 The traditional command and control
regulatory process is analogous to state legislation.26 However, the command
and control or state-centric regulation is beset by many ills.27 Arguably, the
void created in the extractive sector by the non-performance of government
regulatory bodies and the non-implementa-tion of existing legal enactments
is gradually being filled by CSOs. CSOs in Nigeria have proved by their
antecedents that they have major roles to play. This was especially evident
during the Ogoni crisis where the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni
People (MOSOP and other CSOs) played prominent roles in bringing the
alleged atrocities of Shell and its Nigerian government cohorts to the attention
of the world.28
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 The next section will focus on the roles of CSOs in the regulatory regime
via the prisms of information gathering, standard setting and behaviour
modification activities.
4.1 Information Gathering
Arguably, CSOs in Nigeria play vital roles in information gathering in Nigeria’s
extractive sector. Williams et al states that information gathering entails the
“provision for information-gathering, producing knowledge and enabling
actors to judge levels of risks.”29 CSOs engage in information gathering
activities in the regulation process by reporting on the industry, acting as
watch dogs over government activities and engaging in auditing or monitoring
of government activities, among other activities.30 There is a plethora of
publications commissioned by CSOs on Nigeria’s oil industry (including in-
house reports, discussion papers, briefings, books, newspaper articles, etc.)
that provide valuable insights into an erstwhile opaque industry tainted with
corruption.31
A good example is the 2012 “subsidy saga” wherein the federal government
announced the removal of subsidies on petroleum products thereby driving
petrol prices up from N65 to N141 per litre. This led to the increase in the
prices of goods and services including basic necessities such as food, rent,
transport and electricity. The federal government made the announcement on
1 January 2012 even when consultations with CSOs on the issue were ongoing.32
There are two important things to glean from the above. First is that the
government deemed it pertinent to engage with civil society thereby
highlighting recognition of the role that they play in information gathering
and dissemination. Here, the protests were mainly organised online and via
the use of social media and mobile phones. Also, protests took place within
190 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 7: 1: 2016
33 “Occupy Nigeria: Civil Society, Labour Unions to Engage in Series of Mass Action
in January 2012”, Sahara Reporters (1 December  2011) <http://
saharareporters.com/2011/12/01/occupy-nigeria-civil-society-labour-unions-
engage-series-mass-action-january-2012 > accessed 21 July 2015.
34 See the text of the press release by the group comprised of Action Aid, United
Action for Democracy (UAD), Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), Legislative
Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) at “Occupy Nigeria: Civil Society, Labour Unions to
Engage in Series of Mass Action in January 2012” Sahara Reporters (1 December
2011) <http://saharareporters.com/2011/12/01/occupy-nigeria-civil-society-
labour-unions-engage-series-mass-action-january-2012> accessed 20 December
2015.
35 O. Adetayo, “Aig-Imoukhuede Committee indicts 21 Firms for Fraud” The Punch
(25 July  2012) <www.punchng.com/business/business-economy/aig-
imoukhuede-committee-indicts-21-firms-of-fraud/> accessed 20 December
2015.
and outside Nigerian borders. Second is that it was also an acknowledgment
that CSOs wield influence over the populace. These two observations came to
play following the “premature” announcement.
A coalition of CSOs and labour unions under a loose umbrella of “Occupy
Nigeria” staged protests within and outside the country, utilising both traditional
and contemporary media sources based on two broad premises.33 One was
that the subsidy removal would bring hardship on the populace and should
be reversed. The other and more pertinent to the discussion here was the
reasoning that Nigeria’s oil industry should become more transparent and
accountable to Nigerians. The central question in this regard was the perceived
institutional corruption that pervaded the said “subsidy payments” and the
general management of oil revenues.34
The success of the protests, influenced by the release of information
available to the CSOs, precipitated the federal government to announce a
reduction in the new petrol price (from N141 to N97) and set up two
committees to investigate claims of corruption in the sector. The Presidential
Committee on Verification and Reconciliation of Subsidy Claims was set up
to verify and reconcile the findings of the technical committee earlier instituted
by the Federal Ministry of Finance to review all fuel subsidy claims and
payments made in 2011. The committee, in its conclusion that N382 billion
had been fraudulently paid under the subsidy scheme, made 22
recommendations that included the prosecution, recovery and punishments
for external auditors and other government officials found culpable.35 The
Petroleum Revenue Special Task Force was set up by the Minister of Petroleum
in February 2012 to support the programme of the Federal Government of
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Nigeria in enhancing optimisation, probity and accountability in the operations
of the Petroleum Industry.36 The Task Force’s report stated that the Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and the Nigerian government have
mismanaged the revenue accruing from oil and utilised it for illegal or non-
approved purposes with accountability or transparency.37 A House of
Representatives investigation also concluded that the subsidy payments were
shrouded in corruption with about US$6.8bn lost between 2009 and 2011
through corruption, theft and mismanagement.38
These investigations were direct consequences of the protests by Occupy
Nigeria precipitated by the information gathered by CSOs on the pervasive
corruption in the oil industry.39 Without information to premise the opposition
to the withdrawal of subsidy and the subsequent protests, any action in
opposition to the said withdrawal would be baseless and lacking in merit.
Thus, it is important not only to gather information but for such information
to be verifiable. This means that it is not simply opposition statements but
gathering of facts and figures that form hard evidence. The information were
gathered over the years from different sources and pooled together to use for
a common good.
Regarding the outcomes of the information gathering and use, it is clear
that the government and its agencies were forced to investigate claims of
corruption, one of the fundamental basis of opposition to the removal of
subsidy. In fact, the final outcomes have not been great, since the perpetrators
of the corrupt practices have not been apprehended. Specifically, while the
House of Representatives recommended that the erring companies and their
directors face criminal prosecution, the Attorney-General (AG) of Nigeria
initially declined to prosecute the suspects. However, after pressure from the
public and civil society, some of the suspects were arraigned in court. The
charges were subsequently withdrawn by the state on the pretext “to enable the
law enforcement agency conduct detailed investigations into the activities of the
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marketers, preparatory to preferring charges against them that can withstand
legal scrutiny.”40
With regards to the role of CSOs acting as watchdogs of the oil industry,
a good example is its involvement in the Nigerian Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (NEITI). Nigeria signed up to the EITI initiative in
2003 as part of the economic reforms under the Obasanjo administration.
Thus, the NEITI have always engaged CSOs in its activities as a means of
improving transparency and opening the process to the Nigerian public. This
deliberate strategy of NEITI’s involvement with NGOs can be traced to the
onset of the EITI implementation or localisation in Nigeria, where a coalition
of CSOs led by Publish What You Pay, through its various activities, sensitised
the Nigerian public on the inherent benefits accruing from the implementation
of the EITI to the extractive companies, government and the public.41
Furthermore, a host of other CSOs42 have been active in the EITI localisation
by providing input and the NIETI board (management) have provided training
and support to enhance the capacity of CSOs’ effective participation in the
NEITI in Nigeria.43
The EITI “is a global coalition of governments, companies and civil society
working together to improve openness and accountable management of
revenues from natural resources”.44 The NEITI Act that aims to promote and
ensure due process in the payments made by extractive companies to the
coffers of the federal government of Nigeria45 is one of the few laws regulating
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Nigeria’s oil and gas industry that expressly provides for the participation of
CSOs in its activities. Section 6 provides that in making an appointment into
the National Stakeholders Working Group (NSWG), the President shall include
“(ii) representative of Civil Society”.46
In addition to having a representative of CSOs on the board of the NEITI-
NSWG, CSOs also constitute membership of the NEITI Civil Society Steering
Committee with the NEITI Board that is responsible for various outreach
initiatives and activities organised by the NEITI.47 Other roles assigned CSOs
by the NEITI Act include remediation issues arising from NEITI audits, NEITI-
Legislative engagement, dissemination of audit reports and community
participation among others.48 In recognition of the important role that CSOs
play in NEITI, a permanent (full time) Civil Society Liaison Officer is employed
by the NEITI and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was developed in
2006 to promote the CSO contribution to the NEITI.49 These include
identification of issues (that ought to be of public interest to the fore), agenda
setting, public education and enlightenment, agents of social change and
mobilisation, monitoring and oversight, advisory, whistle blowing, observation
and feedback.50
There are shortcomings in the practical involvement of CSOs in the NEITI
process.51 Firstly, the lack of cohesion and consequent internal strife and
division among CSOs, a situation exploited by the government, has dampened
their expected levels of participation in the NEITI.52 Secondly, the appointment
of CSO representative to the NEITI board is the prerogative of the President.
Thus, the President may appoint a moderate personality that will not oppose
government stance or activities. To redress this anomaly, the NEITI signed an
MOU with CSOs that civil society will be consulted in selecting their
representative.53 That notwithstanding, the prerogative to select the
representative still rests (ultimately) with the President. This situation limits
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the role that CSOs are expected to play as these groups ought to have the
liberty to elect their representatives to the board. Electing a CSO representative
to the NEITI board should (ideally) be based on merit, a manifesto or mandate
that aligns with the broad aspirations of CSOs in line with current
circumstances recognised and agreed to by CSOs. With the President appointing
a CSO representative, they are no different from other government appointees
on the board who serve at the will of the President.
Thirdly, it appears that the NEITI focuses on CSOs in Lagos and Abuja to
the detriment of those that are active in the Niger Delta and are closer to the
people most impacted by the oil industry.54 While one of the consequences of
this omission is the absence of environmental matters from the remit of the
NEITI Act,55 NEITI recently engaged in extensive nationwide consultations
with NGOs. It is for reasons as this that it is better for a CSO representative to
the NEITI Board to be left to civil society. Individuals interested in representing
CSOs on the NEITI Board will have to outline a plan for their tenure on the
board that would expectedly include the recognition of member organisations.
Furthermore, electing a member to represent CSOs will promote a democratic
process among themselves wherein all recognised organisations will have a
vote and therefore be equal to others (irrespective of location and prestige/
visibility). Finally, there is the contention that the government and NEITI are
more interested in gaining international credibility and legitimacy than
actualising the mandate of the NEITI Act vis-à-vis CSO participation.56
To the extent that this contention may be valid, one may also point at the
contributions that the CSOs have made to the NEITI process particularly and
Nigeria’s oil sector more generally, with satisfaction. While this is not suggesting
that CSOs have made optimal contributions to the oil sector, and the NEITI
process more particularly, it is clear that they have made a difference in the
process of improving the accountability process in Nigeria’s characteristically
opaque oil industry. Decades of institutional rot in the management of Nigeria’s
oil industry requires years of consistent and painstaking involvement,
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monitoring and oversight as well as advocacy on the part of the CSOs to
make considerable impacts. In effect, if it is the case that the “little” strides
made by CSOs in the NEITI process are deemed nothing more than a
smokescreen by the government, with time, the impacts of the CSOs may
grow to become more substantive. Indeed, with the new government in place
that has anti-corruption high on its agenda, this is the time for the CSOs to
flourish within NEITI.57
It is trite to note that CSOs in Nigeria fulfilling their obligations as
information gatherers do so without the advantage of a well-established
freedom of information regime or the protection of whistle-blowers law. In
Nigeria, as with many countries in Africa, the state partners with multi-
national corporations (MNCs) that operate the extractive industry, given that
information on these operations are often considered sensitive and well-
guarded. Justice Onalaja noted the difficulty in obtaining information in
Nigeria’s oil industry in Shell v. Isaiah thus:
A vital consideration in the oil spillage cases is the extent of the
oil spillage. The pattern of defence of the appellant has been to
withhold from the court the report of the oil spillage carried out
by their employees. In Tiebo’s case supra, the appellant’s report of
the oil spillage was similarly withheld from the court…58
Thus, CSOs often carry out independent investigations at their own costs
and risk as well as making their findings easily accessible.59  This is a huge
responsibility and a laudable one as the information gathered often forms the
basis for further research and litigation and the attendant benefits. Nigeria’s
Freedom of Information (FoI) Act now provides a legal basis for CSOs to
make legitimate requests for information that is not in the public domain.
For example, following a decision by the ECOWAS Court of Justice on the
right of the people and communities of the Niger Delta to a general satisfactory
environment and to an adequate standard of living in SERAP v Federal Republic
of Nigeria,60 Amnesty International and Socio-Economic Rights and
196 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 7: 1: 2016
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judgment/>  accessed 20 December 2015.
62 “Nigerian President Signs Freedom of Information Bill”, Freedominfo.org (3 June
2011) <www.freedominfo.org/2011/06/nigerian-president-signs-freedom-of-
information-bill/> accessed 20 December 2015.
63 Edetaen Ojo, Executive Director, Media Rights Agenda. See, “Nigerian President
Signs Freedom of Information Bill” Freedominfo.org ( 3 June 2011)
<www.freedominfo.org/2011/06/nigerian-president-signs-freedom-of-
information-bill/> accessed 20 December 2015.
64 Ene Enonche, Coordinator of the Right to Know initiative. See, “Nigerian President
Signs Freedom of Information Bill” Freedominfo.org ( 3 June 2011)
<www.freedominfo.org/2011/06/nigerian-president-signs-freedom-of-
information-bill/> accessed 20 December 2015.
65 A broad coalition of Nigerian CSOs worked and advocated for the passage of the
FOI bill under the leadership of the Right to Know Movement, Nigeria, Media
Rights Agenda, and the Open Society Justice Initiative in partnership with its
sister organisation, the Open Society Initiative for West Africa. See, “Freedom of
Information Act Signals Consolidation of Nigeria’s Democracy”, Press Release by
Open Society Justice Initiative (May 31, 2011) <www.opensociety
foundations.org/press-releases/freedom-information-act-signals-consolidation-
nigeria-s-democracy> accessed 20 December 2015.
Accountability Project (SERAP) jointly sent a Freedom of Information request
to the Federal Government of Nigeria to provide information on the measures
taken to implement the court’s decision.61
Although the implementation of the law is still far from perfect in Nigeria,
the passage of the law opens new vistas of opportunity to promote transparency
and accountability in Nigeria’s oil industry.62 CSO representatives noted that:
“The signing of the FoI Bill into law is the clearest demonstration ever of the
power of civil society working together to influence public policy and initiate
reform”63 and “with the new law, Nigerians finally have vital tools to uncover
facts, fight corruption and hold officials and institutions accountable.”64 Also
pertinent to note is that the passage of the law is indicative of what a vibrant
CSO community can achieve despite the odds stacked against them.65 To put
this in perspective, the FoI Act was signed into law (2011) after 11 years of its
first submission to the National Assembly in 1999 and its passage by both the
House of Representatives and the Senate in 2007. Perhaps even more intriguing
is the fact that the bill was developed and submitted to the National Assembly
by Freedom of Information Coalition, a network of over 150 civil society
organisations in Nigeria, comprising civil rights, grassroots and community-
based non-governmental organisations led by the Media Rights Agenda. To
2016 THE CIVIL SOCIETY & THE REGULATION OF THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY 197
consider that this coalition worked together for at least 11 years to achieve
this feat is noteworthy of emulation, replication and consultation by African
colleagues, especially in countries where such laws are still unheard of.
4.2 Standard Setting
CSOs in Nigeria have contributed to setting of standards in the oil industry,
broadly speaking, in two ways. The first refers to the development of new
laws and the other refers to their roles in development initiatives for the
Niger Delta region. With regards their role in the development of new laws
that create new standards, the analysis in the previous section attests to this
assertion. Furthermore, CSOs have, and are, playing an integral role in the
development of the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB). The PIB is one of the most
important bills in Nigeria’s history. The plan is to develop it as the holistic
legal and regulatory framework for the Nigeria’s oil and gas industry.
Without going into the checkered history of the PIB that has remained
stuck in the National Assembly since 2009, CSOs have played a vital part
both in contributing to its development as a law and more pertinently, ensuring
that the bill does not “die” in the legislature. Also, CSOs have made inputs to
the bill by submitting memoranda to the National Assembly66 as well as
honouring invitations by the National Assembly to make inputs to it.67
Regarding the role of CSOs to ensure that the bill does not go comatose in the
legislature, Victoria Ohaeri, the Executive Director of the Spaces for Change
(S4C), an NGO in Nigeria noted that the:
The [PIB] Bill was left to gather dust on the shelves of government
offices after a major legislative effort to have the bill passed in
2009 was stalled. It was mainly the January 2012 protests (largely
coordinated by civil society groups and NGOs) which forced major
66 Amnesty International Nigeria: Joint Memorandum on Petroleum Industry Bill,
March 2012. Which was a coalition of Amnesty International and 12 Nigerian
NGOs. Also see the Joint Position Paper on Petroleum Industry Bill: Issues of
Concern to Communities and Civil Society. May 2011. Prepared by coalition of
CSOs including the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) and
Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth, Nigeria amongst others.
Available online at CISLAC website at <www.cislacnigeria.net/2011/07/policy-
brief-on-petroleum-industry-bill/>  accessed 20 December 2015.
67 PIB Advocacy Working Group: Joint Civil Society Memorandum on the Petroleum
Industry Bill (July 2013) <http://issuu.com/spaces.for.change/docs/
cso_joint_memorandum.july_17.2013> accessed 20 December 2015.
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high-level probes into the administration of fuel subsidies and
reforms in the oil sector that awakened government interest in the
PIB.68
 In December 2015, the PIB was jettisoned and Petroleum Industry Governance
and Institutional Framework Bill 2015 have replaced it.69
Murphy and Bendell in their definition of civil regulation highlight the
importance of standard setting. According to them, civil regulation “is where
organisations of civil society such as NGOs, set the standards for business
behaviour. Enterprises then choose to adopt or not to adopt those standards.”70
The involvement of CSOs in community development initiatives and activities
in the Niger Delta is appreciated against the backdrop of community
development carried out by the state and MNCs operating in the region. Indeed
the literature is replete with the argument that the lack of development of the
Niger Delta is a fundamental factor that feeds the cycle of poverty and violence
in the region.71 While visits to the region confirm the varied assertions, the
Akassa community stood out for its unique development structure and
achievements since the mid-1990s, a period when the region was becoming
restive due to the perceived “underdevelopment”. The next section focuses on
the Akassa initiative.
4.3 Collaboration between CSOs and Oil MNCs in Nigeria’s
Extractive Sector
This section contends that CSOs in Nigeria have gone from passive bystanders
to active collaborators in the extractive industry. The Akassa community is
an example of a successful collaborative effort between MNC and oil producing
community in developing CSR projects or standards. Statoil selected the Akassa
community in Bayelsa State for a social initiative after Environmental Impact
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72 Norwegian Embassy Nigeria Website “CSR: Statoil’s Akassa Community
Development Project” <www.emb-norway.com.ng/Norsk/Naringsliv-og-
naringslivssamarbeid1/CSR-Statoils-Akassa-Community-Development-
Project1/> accessed 20 December 2015.
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Assessment (EIA) studies identified the community as most likely to be
impacted by the company’s deep-water offshore wells.72
The company adopted a unique method of CSR delivery in Nigeria by
partnering with a non-governmental charitable organisation - Pro Natura
(International) – to initiate and facilitate the community development projects
based on a “participatory development model”.73 With the company providing
the funds, Pro Natura set to advance a development model with the active
participation of all sections of the community. The resultant Akassa Community
Development Programme (ACDP) established in 1998 was easily regarded
and recognised as “owned” by the community. The ACDP concentrated on
building new local institutions to initiate and manage activities in the fields
of poverty alleviation, health, education, natural resources and works. In
2002, it evolved to the Akassa Development Foundation (ADF), a legally
incorporated trust with capacity to enter into contracts on behalf of the people
of Akassa and bear legal responsibility for the contracts. It also has a bank
account of its own, a well thought out constitution and a board of trustees
elected by the Akassa people.74 It is unsurprising that even when the rest of
the Niger Delta was enmeshed in violent conflicts, the Akassa community
remained peaceful with the community development initiative playing a major
role.
More pertinent to the discussion in this section of the paper is that the
initiative has set a standard in community development programmes in the
region. Thus, the Akassa model in the Niger Delta is an example wherein
standards were set by the CSO (Pro Natura, a Nigerian CSO) (with the active
participation of the Akassa community) in partnership with the oil MNC.
Many of the oil MNCs operating in the Niger Delta have since repackaged
their community assistance projects, significantly partnering with CSOs to
conceptualise and deliver on them. For example, Chevron has endowed the
Niger Delta Partnership Initiative (NDPI) Foundation with US$50 million
over a five-year period from 2010 to 2014 with the latter aiming to raise the
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portfolio to US$100 million with donor partner funding.75 The Initiative’s
Nigerian affiliate, the Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta
(PIND), will participate in the design, development and monitoring of
programmes. PIND’s remit includes the economic development, capacity
building, peace building, as well as analysis and advocacy. Interestingly,
communities, including five local council areas in the Oron region of Bayelsa
State, have also adopted the Akassa model to promote their development.76
4.4 Behaviour Modification
Behaviour modification is perhaps the most potent of the strategies that CSOs
in Nigeria have utilised to influence changes in the legal framework regulating
the extractive industry. Simply, it refers to the avenues that CSOs exploit to
galvanise public opinion in raising awareness and/or support for a cause.77
CSOs in Nigeria rely extensively on organised protests, litigation,
publications, lobbying of the MNCs and the State, public awareness campaigns
to effect behaviour modification vis-à-vis the oil industry.78 CSOs in Nigeria
have a long history of protesting the activities of the oil industry with the
earlier periods characterised by uncoordinated efforts of loosely formed groups
such as traditional elders and elite members of the region, for example. The
activities of MOSOP in the 1990s changed things radically because the group
was able to mobilise the Ogonis (an entire ethnic group) to identify with and
support its cause.79 Furthermore, due to the impact of Shell’s activities on
Ogoniland and its alleged collusion with Nigerian authorities in the trial and
“murder” of Ken Saro-Wiwa (who was one of the leaders of Ogoniland),
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accessed 20 December 2014. However, a subsidiary of the Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the Nigerian Petroleum Development Company
(NPDC) has indicated that it is willing to take over Shell’s oil wells in Ogoniland.
The people of Ogoniland are against this move contending that Federal
Government and Shell has refused to implement the UNEP report on   Ogoniland,
which was highly critical of Shell. See C Amanze-Nwachukwu, “Shell Oil Fields:
Ogonis resist NPDC’s re-entry moves” ThisDay Newspaper (19 February 2013)
<www.thisdaylive.com/articles/shell-oil-fields-ogonis-resist-npdc-s-re-entry-
moves/139952/> accessed 20 December 2015.
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Oxford Development Studies 605.
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MOSOP and the people of Ogoniland rejected Shell and withdrew its “social
licence” by protesting and mobilising against Shell.80
Thus, for more than twenty years, Shell has not operated any of its facilities
in Ogoniland.81 Ogoniland community “revoked” the social licence of Shell
to operate in its area notwithstanding that under Nigerian laws, Shell has the
right to operate in the region. While other ethnic groups in the region borrowed
the MOSOP-template to organise their protests, the Federal Government’s
highhanded responses contributed to the rise of militancy as a means of
further protests. Notably, women have also led protests in the Niger Delta
with the Ugborodo protests of 2002 resulting in Chevron/Texaco’s declaration
of a force majeure and the company signing an MOU with the community.82
Litigation has now become a deliberate strategy employed by CSOs in
their bid to influence the activities of the state and oil companies that operate
the oil industry in Nigeria. The rising number of cases instituted both in
Nigeria and abroad by, or, with the assistance of CSOs is an indication of the
rising reliance on litigation. These cases have been instituted across court
systems and jurisdictions around the globe. For instance, while Gbemre v.
SPDC was initiated in a Federal High Court in Nigeria; Bowoto v. Chevron
and Wiwa v. Shell were instituted in the USA; Akpan v. Shell was heard at
The Hague, Netherlands while Bodo Community v SPDC83 was heard in the
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United Kingdom. In addition to national jurisdictions, regional judicial bodies
including the ECOWAS Court84 and the African Commission on Human and
People’s Rights85 have also heard cases or communications. Although litigation
has yielded a mixed bag of results, there have been some notable gains, even
in situations where the victories have been regarded as pyrrhic.86 Specifically,
in Wiwa v. Shell, the high profile nature of the case put Shell and its subsidiaries
in the spotlight; further propelled the situation in the Niger Delta into
international reckoning and resulted in financial settlements that the company
would otherwise not have agreed to pay.
Other cases have had more direct effects on behaviour modification. For
instance, the activities of CSOs working on the Gbemre case – Rights Action/
Friends of the Earth and Climate Justice Programme (CJP) – had two
significant impacts on the Iwherekan community. First, the community became
aware of the negative impacts of gas flaring on their environment and lives.
Second, they were able to, with the support of the CSOs, initiate legal
proceedings to challenge the continued flaring of gas in their community.
Although the decision of the court that mandated the Federal Government to
review some relevant laws is still under appeal, the Senate’s passage of the
Gas Flaring Prohibition and Punishment Bill of 2009 is purportedly a direct
impact of the case.87 Notably, it can be argued that there is no direct correlation
between CSO activities and change in attitude of oil companies directly linked
to this law. Observably, the case has contributed to the jurisprudence on oil-
related litigation in Nigeria and appears to have highlighted the significant
impact that litigation may have on effecting the required change in Nigeria’s
oil industry.881999.
2016 THE CIVIL SOCIETY & THE REGULATION OF THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY 203
89 Lucky Imade, “Democratising Democracy in Nigeria: The Role of Civil Society
Organisations” (2001) 3(1) Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 8.
90 Oshionebo (n 16).
91  ibid.
92 Eghosa Ekhator, “Improving Access to Environmental Justice under the African
Charter: The Roles of NGOS in Nigeria” (2014) 22(1) African Journal of
International and Comparative Law 63.
93 Obiora Okafor, “Modest Harvests: On the Significant (but Limited) Impact of
Human Rights NGOs on Legislative and Executive Behaviour in Nigeria” (2004)
48(1) Journal of African Law 23, 24.
94 ibid.
95 Ikelegbe (n 18) 460.
5.  CONCLUSION
Civil society works in tandem with democratic values. Imade argues that in
the Nigerian context: a weak civil society and non-democratic culture is to a
large degree the product of political instability: conversely a vibrant civil society
coupled with civility and social capital are the basic building blocks for democratic
survival.89 Moreover, a vibrant civil society can champion government reforms,
confront corruption, advocate respect for human rights, promote and defend
democratic processes and institutions. Imade further posited that giving civil
society a greater role in governance is the most effective avenue to economic
development, sustainable peace and stable government in Nigeria.
In Nigeria, CSOs perform regulatory functions via their activities in the
oil and gas sector, particularly pertaining to MNCs. For example, CSOs can
challenge MNCs through boycott, public campaigns and other forms of
pressure. According to Oshionebo,90  this is akin to the impact of state
regulation and misdemeanours of such MNCs can lead to social sanctions. In
addition, CSOs are independent of the MNCs and the Nigerian State. Thus,
they are in a position to advice and influence both the MNCs and the state
without bias. Furthermore, CSOs can also influence regulation through
litigation, publications, lobbying of the MNCs and the State, public awareness
campaigns, among other strategies.91 CSOs have been very proactive in
litigation, especially in areas of oil pollution, environmental degradation
and human rights. Such litigations have added to a growing jurisprudence on
regulation of MNCs by CSOs in Nigeria.92 This is evident in human rights
protection within Nigeria where the courts have produced “pro-human rights
alterations and reformations.”93 Thus, the Nigerian government has “become
more sensitive to the environmental and social responsibilities of oil
companies”94 and MNCs are expected to “negotiate and reach memoranda of
understanding with host communities, honour agreements, and be more
responsive to [their] problems.”95
